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SHOULD THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE HEDGE OIL PRICES 
IN ORDER TO SAVE MONEY? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Objective: This paper explores one possible solution to the DoD problem of 
increased expenditures due to rises in the costs of jet fuel. This paper provides a brief 
overview of the futures market and of commercially accepted practices utilized by the 
airlines within the futures market. The goal of this paper is to explore the feasibility of 
the government entering the futures market in order to reduce the current DoD jet fuel 
cost and whether the potential savings would outweigh the associated risks and costs. 
This paper briefly discusses the current method of procurement and examines the 
commercial practices of futures trading, focusing on the airline industry which offers the 
greatest affinity to the DoD.  
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I. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To address this overall objective, several research questions were developed. 
1. Should the DoD enter into the futures market and hedge oil prices? 
2. Is there a budgetary need for the DoD to make this move in light of current DoD 
spending? 
3. Are there other options? 
4. What are the benefits and drawbacks if the DoD enters the futures market? 
5. What would be the obstacles to DoD’s entry into the market? 
6. Is entering the futures market politically feasible? 
7. How would DoD’s entrance influence the futures market? 
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II. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
 Chapter Overview: The purpose of this chapter is to explain current government 
procurement of fuel, convey the amount of fuel that the DoD uses and the cost of that 
fuel, explain some of the budget impacts that the DoD fuel costs have to the U.S. 
government and finally, to explain how increases in fuel costs have affected readiness in 
the DoD.  
A. HOW THE DOD PROCURES FUEL 
 The DoD is the largest single consumer of fuel in the United States, purchasing 
1.8% of America’s total transportation fuel requirements.1 The DoD procures fuel at 
current market prices through the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC), using the 
Defense Working Capital Fund (DWCF). The working capital fund is replenished by 
operations.2 The DWCF outlays the initial funding to purchase fuel and as operations 
occur individual command funds reimburse the DFWC. This way an individual squadron 
commander can keep tight reigns on his or her budget but the DFWC can ensure that the 
fuel is purchased. Also the DWCF can continue to run without the interruption of the end 
of the fiscal year.3  
The amount of money that the DWCF receives each year is determined by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) projections. The end goal of the DFWC fund 
is to break even so that the amount of money that it outlays is replenished by operational 
commands. The problem is that the OMB has been grossly inaccurate with its forecasts 
and Congress has had to appropriate additional funding to the DWCF.4 
B. CURRENT DOD FUEL USAGE 
The United States government is the world’s largest single fuel burning entity. 
The DoD consumes 440,000 barrels of oil per day or 160 million barrels of oil per year; 
                                                 
1 Lawrence E. Spinetta "War Without Oil: Catalyst for Transformation Furl Hedging: Lessons from the 





at 2007 prices that equates to over $14 billion dollars.5 According to the DESC6, the 
service breakdown for fuel is:∗ 
Department of the Air Force: 53% 
Department of the Navy (including Marine Corps): 32% 
Department of the Army: 12% 
 The DESC fact book also states that in FY05 the Army, Navy and Marines spent a 
combined $8 billion on petroleum and the U.S. Air Force spent $6.2 billion.7 U.S. 
military forces stationed in Iraq on average consume nine gallons of fuel for every 
soldier, sailor, airman and marine.8  
A great demand has been put on the world’s fossil fuel resources. Both the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) and military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have forced the 
DoD to use more fuel. Mobility airlift, battle group deployment and tactical fighting all 
require fossil fuel to carry out their missions; it is fundamental in how the DoD 
accomplishes its mission. Additionally the infrastructures of the military services are 
comprised of older aircraft and ships. These items are not all utilizing the latest 
technology in energy-efficient propulsion. Finally, due to recent world events, including 
the industrial revolution in China and other so-called Tiger nations, world wide energy 
consumption has grown exponentially.9 The demand for oil is outstripping the supply of 
the valuable resource.10  
                                                 
5 Sohbet Karbuz. (2006, July, 13). Pentagon and Peak Oil: A Military Literature Review. Energy 
Bulletin, 342, Retrieved March 3,2007, from http://www.energybulletin.net 
6 Ibid. 
∗ Other government entities are included in the breakdown but not listed 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Dave Carter, Dan Rogers, and Betty Simkins. "Fuel Hedging in the Airline Industry." 
10 Kevin Cheng, .Mercer-Blackman "High Oil Prices Challenge Policymakers." IMF Survey Magazine: 




Figure 1.   Varying Demand. (From: Cheng, Kevin .Mercer-Blackman "High Oil Prices 
Challenge Policymakers." IMF Survey Magazine: IMF Research  
 
As seen above the demand for oil has become greater but the evidence below 
suggests that the supply of oil is dwindling.  
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Figure 2.   Reversing the Trend (From Cheng, Kevin .Mercer-Blackman "High Oil Prices 
Challenge Policymakers." IMF Survey Magazine: IMF Research 
 
Given the increased demands and corresponding lower supply, various industries 
have been forced to adapt to fluctuating prices. The commercial aviation industry has 
utilized hedging strategies to lessen their exposure to these fluctuations in the price of jet 
fuel.11 The DoD, however, does not utilize this strategy and procures fuel at the spot 
price.  
                                                 
11 Kevin Cheng, Mercer-Blackman "High Oil Prices Challenge Policymakers." IMF Survey Magazine: 
IMF Research 11200720 NOV 2007 1-7. 1 DEC 2007 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2007/RES1120A.htm>.  
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C. BUDGET IMPACTS 
 In 2006 the DoD fossil fuel budget was approximately 2.5-3% of the total 
national-defense budget.12 The most recent supplement to the federal budget included a 
request from the Air Force to account for increases in fuel cost for the fiscal year.13 
Additionally Congress contributes to working capital accounts in order to compensate for 
rising fuel costs. Since September 11th, the amount of money requested for fuel by the 
services has doubled.14 Every ten-dollar per barrel increase in the price of oil costs the 
U.S. Air Force approximately $850M per year.15 United States military forces in Iraq use 
about 1.7 million gallons of fuel a day.16 
Despite this increase, DoD fuel costs are not the largest issue facing the budget in 
the coming years. The DoD consumption of fuel is less than 2% of the total U.S. 
domestic consumption of oil.17 Therefore the DoD cannot drive prices up or down as a 
fuel consumer. Yet fuel costs have become increasingly noticeable as a budget item 
because fuel costs represent a large amount of the life-cycle costs of mobility aircraft and 
non-nuclear ships.18 
Fuel use also affects the budget in other ways. The U.S. needs to keep firm 
relations with oil producing countries in order to maintain the supply of fuel needed to 
move the DoD. Therefore the DoD fuel use is subject to many cost drivers and political 
regulations that hamper the services from optimizing fuel use. Being able to hedge fuel 
costs would aid in the DoD capability to utilize fuel and budget for future activities. 
                                                 
12  The Department of Defense Green Procurement Strategy. (12 March 2006). Retrieved March 19, 
2007, from http://www.ofee.gov/gp/gppstrat.pdf 
13 FY06 Budget Priorities: Department of Defense." www.whitehouse.gov. 23 Sept 2007. United States 
Office of Management and Budget. 26 Sep 2007 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/defense.html>. 
14 Sohbet Karbuz. (2006, July, 13). Pentagon and Peak Oil: A Military Literature Review. Energy 
Bulletin, 342, Retrieved March 3,2007, from http://www.energybulletin.net 
15 Lawrence E. Spinetta . "War Without Oil: Catalyst for Transformation Furl Hedging: Lessons from 
the Airlines." Air Force Journal of Logistics XXX3(2006): 32-45.  
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Air Force Studies Board, (2006). A Review of the United States Air Force and Department of 
Defense Aerospace and Propulsion Needs. Washington D.C.: The National Academies Press.  
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Hedging is a proven, efficient business practice. It can aid in anticipating fuel 
costs and provide beneficial strategies that enable the DoD to plan, budget and execute a 
fuel resource procurement strategy. This would be in direct opposition to how fuel is 
procured currently. Decision makers could allocate the correct budget based on a 
stabilized price. The end goal would be that the budgeted amount for DoD fuel would be 
commensurate with the amount and cost of fuel that the DoD needs to conduct 
operations.  
Stabilized prices and predictable cycles would also lessen the taxpayers’ burden. 
Reducing the taxpayer burden was one of the desired outcomes of the Defense 
Transformation Act (DTA).19 The DTA was initiated to address serious problems in 
regards to DoD expenditures.20 Fuel procurement and management is one such serious 
problem because the amount and cost of fuel has risen in recent years. Fuel efficiency 
must be part of the objective criteria for all applicable acquisition decisions in order to 
meet the flexibility mandated by the DTA. The DoD may have to look towards 
alternative fuels that are cheaper and or more readily available so that overall fuel 
efficient is increased. Hedging has the ability to improve cash-flow management because 
it helps to ensure that the funds are available to meet the objectives of the DoD. In theory 
hedging could make the need to seek supplemental funding obsolete. 
D. READINESS IMPACTS 
The FY06 fuel budget for the Air Force was $800M greater than the fuel budget 
for FY05 and after the FY06 budget was submitted the Air Force had another shortfall of 
$800M.21 These budgetary shortfalls had wide-ranging consequences. 
In FY05 in order to deal with shortfalls the Air Force made unilateral cuts across 
all programs. In FY06 the Air Force already had $3.7B in unfunded requirements.22 
Unfunded requirements are programs that are needed by operational commands but have 
                                                 
19 Jerry L. McCaffery, and L.R. Jones. Budgeting and Financial Management for National Defense. 
1st. Greenwich C.T.: Information Age Publishing McCaffery and Jones, 2004. 
20 Ibid.  
21 Lawrence E. Spinetta. "War Without Oil: Catalyst for Transformation Fuel Hedging: Lessons from 
the Airlines." Air Force Journal of Logistics XXX3(2006): 32-45. 
22 Ibid. 
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yet to be funded due to budget constraints. In order to pay for the exacerbated fuel bill, 
$1.1B in new Air Force funding was allocated from non-fuel programs.23 Along with 
preventing the funding of other requirements, the budget shortfalls also affected existing 
programs. Money allocated from the Airborne Laser Lab program in order to pay for the 
current year fuel bill resulted is a schedule slip. The Joint Strike Fighter may also slip in 
schedule because its engine funding line was tapped for a $100M reduction.24 
It is not only future programs that are suffering form the run on fuel. Air Combat 
Command (ACC) has reduced it flying hours in order to fit within the budget 
constraints.25 The impact on a reduction of flying hours is readiness; pilots will not have 
enough training sorties to be considered fully mission qualified. Analysis has shown that 
the amount of flying hours will have to be reduced by ten percent each year from FY08 to 
FY13 in order to accommodate the increased fuel bill.26 
E. SUMMARY 
 The DoD procures fuel at the spot price. In recent years the demand for oil has 
increased; additionally the U.S. is at war so the DoD’s total fuel consumption has 
increased even more. The increased demand has driven up the price for fuel. This has had 
a negative effect on the budget of the DoD and hurt readiness in the military. Hedging 
fuel cost may prove to be a viable solution to several of these problems.  
                                                 
23 Lawrence E. Spinetta. "War Without Oil: Catalyst for Transformation Fuel Hedging: Lessons from 
the Airlines." Air Force Journal of Logistics XXX3(2006): 32-45. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Wicke, “Rising Fuel Costs Tighten Air Force Belt,” Air Force Link, 9 Sep 2006. 
26 Lawrence E. Spinetta.  "War Without Oil: Catalyst for Transformation Furl Hedging: Lessons from 
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III. EXPLANATION OF FUTURES 
 Chapter Overview: In today’s world commodity prices can increase and 
decrease at rapid rates. For those organizations that use commodities in the course of 
doing business the commodity price fluctuations increase risk exposure. Businesses do 
not know the future price of commodities and can not forecast expenses with sufficient 
accuracy to ensure that a profit is realized. This uncertainty exposes business to risk. The 
financial derivatives markets helps businesses mitigate the amount of risk to which they 
are exposed. The purpose of this chapter is to explain financial derivatives and to 
describe the financial derivate tools that make hedging possible. 
A. FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES 
A financial derivative is a financial instrument that gets its value from the price of 
an underlying asset.27 In most cases an asset is traded at the spot price on the open 
market. This allows for the sale and purchase of an asset to occur in real time. The 
financial derivative is a financial contract that has a value which is derived from the value 
of the underlying asset. The underlying asset can be a stock, a commodity, equity, 
currency, a bond or a number of other things.28 
Financial derivatives enable people to exchange risk on the open market place. To 
better explain derivatives we will use a farmer as an example. Farmers utilize financial 
derivatives to mitigate risk. Farmers can utilize a derivative to sell their crops before the 
harvest at a specified price. By doing so a farmer has locked in a certain amount of profits 
because no matter what the price of the crop at harvest time the Farmer has already sold 
his future crop at a specified price. In this case the underlying asset is the crop and the 
farmer is mitigating his risk by entering the derivative market. While this example 
focused on a comparatively smaller business (a farmer), large firms such as McDonalds 
can utilize the derivative market for risk mitigation also. 
                                                 
27 George Kleinman. Trading Commodities and Financial Futures: A step by step Guide to Mastering 
the Market. 3rd. New York: Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2005.  
28 Ibid. 
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Some organizations purchase commodities at set prices to lock in costs that they 
will have to outlay over future periods. However, speculators also utilize the financial 
derivatives market to realize gains. A speculator can make a profit by utilizing an 
arbitrage strategy in which he exploits a weakness in the price of a contract. A common 
arbitrage strategy would occur when a commodity sells for $5 on one market but $6 on 
another market. A person who deals in risk arbitrage could exploit this discontinuity by 
buying on one market and selling for a profit on another market. The speculator in the 
derivatives market can garner great returns—at the risk of potentially great losses—
because the derivatives market allows speculators to buy and sell contracts with little or 
no money at the time of the sale. This is because the buyer is not purchasing the entire 
underlying asset. This capability is referred to as leverage.29 For the speculators the risk 
of the derivatives market is much higher then owning the security outright and the return 
is also greater. Hence the derivatives market allows for the brokering of risk between 
firms, brokers, hedgers and speculators. Each party can trade risk to mitigate exposure in 
their own portfolios of assets. The next section describes common financial instruments 
on the derivative market: forward contracts, futures contracts, swaps and options. 
B. FORWARD CONTRACT 
A forward contract is a basic derivative contract that specifics the price of an asset 
at a future date or not on the spot market.30 The futures contract allows for the purchase 
or the sale of the asset at the date specified. The forward price is the price set for the asset 
on the specified date. Therefore the value of the forward contract is very similar to the 
value of a stock because it is based on a perceived value of a tangible asset. The price 
reflects the current consensus of what the asset will be worth in the future. In order to 
purchase a forward contract the buyer does not have to put money down at the time of the 
sale but agrees to buy the asset at a set date in the future.  
C. FUTURES CONTRACT 
Futures contracts are very similar to forward contract but futures contracts require 
the buyer of the contract to pay some percentage of the sales price, or a margin, when 
                                                 
29 George Kleinman. Trading Commodities and Financial Futures: A step by step Guide to Mastering 
the Market. 3rd. New York: Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2005. 
30 Ibid. 
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purchasing the contract. Futures are also traded on exchanges, unlike forward contracts, 
and are therefore more heavily government regulated. Futures contracts also specify the 
quantity, quality and date that the commodity should be received. The standardization of 
the futures contract is done so that trade of the contracts can occur. 
Futures contracts are transferable but they do require that the holder of the 
contract on the buy date must buy the underlying asset. That said, the contractually-
required physical delivery of the commodity rarely actually occurs; most contracts are 
settled without physical transference of the underlying asset.31 The risk associated with 
the buyer and the seller of futures contracts is almost unlimited because the price of a 
particular item does not have a ceiling. In the end futures contracts are a zero sum 
game.32 There are winners and there are losers when dealing with futures contracts. 
The cost-of-carry model is used to price futures contracts.33 The cost-of-carry 
model is designed to neutralize the difference between the assets being purchased at the 
spot price or the future price because the cost of carrying the asset or the cost of owning 
the asset for a certain period of time is built into the price. The futures price equals the 
spot price plus the carry cost minus carry return. The carry return is the dividend gained 
by holding the asset until the end of the contract. 
Arbitrage occurs when the cost of carry model yields an unequal favoritism to the 
spot price or the futures price. Cash and carry arbitrage occurs when the futures price is 
greater than the spot price plus the carrying cost minus the carry return. Reverse cash and 
carry occurs when the spot price plus the carrying cost less the carry return is greater than 
the futures price. 
                                                 
31 Who Loses When Airlines Win." Ask Meta Filter. 2007. 5 Sep 2007 
<http://ask.metafilter.com/37145/who-loses-when-airlines-win>.  
32 George Kleinman. Trading Commodities and Financial Futures: A step by step Guide to Mastering 
the Market. 3rd. New York: Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2005. 
33 Helyette German. Commodities and Commodity Derivatives : Modeling and Pricing for 
Agricultures, Metals and Energy . 1st. West Sussex England: John Wiley and Sons, 2005.  
  14
D. SWAPS 
In order to mitigate risk from exposure to interest rates many firms utilize 
swaps.34 Organizations borrowing large sums of money from lenders are affected 
negatively by rising interest rates. Increased interest rates make it harder for some 
organizations to make a profit. So in order to mitigate the risk associated with fluctuating 
interest rates organizations can utilize swaps. Swaps are agreements to trade a series of 
cash flows over a specified period of time in the future. A simple example of a swap is a 
currency swap between two different companies. USA corporation, based in the U.S. 
wants to gain financing in euros to reduce its exposure generated by exports to the United 
Kingdom and U.K corporation, based in the U.K, wants to gain financing in U.S. dollars 
in order to mitigate exposed risk generated by sales in the United States. Both companies 
could take out fixed rate loans in their respective domestic currency for equal exchange 
level amounts and then swap the fixed rate payments. Such a swap would allow for each 
company to mitigate their risk exposure that was generated during the course of business. 
Swaps are utilized because they are considered very liquid instruments. There are many 
different permutations to swaps trades. Swap trades can exchange fixed rate returns for 
floating rate returns and or exchange cash flows in different currencies. 
E. OPTIONS 
Options are broken into two different categories: calls and puts. A call option 
gives a buyer the right to purchase something at a specified strike price. Buying a put 
option gives the right to sell the underlying asset, normally a stock, at a specified strike 
price. The options are tied to a specific date referred to as the exercise date.35 Buyers and 
sellers can exercise their options up until the exercise date after which time the option has 
expired. Put options are used to mitigate the risk of an asset value falling below a certain 
threshold. If the value of the asset is declining the owner of a put option can sell the asset 
to control his losses. In this technique a put option creates an artificial floor value that can 
help him mitigate his risk. A call option works in the other direction, a speculator can 
                                                 
34 George Kleinman. Trading Commodities and Financial Futures: A step by step Guide to Mastering 
the Market. 3rd. New York: Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2005.  
35 Ibid. 
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purchase the option to procure an underlying asset at a specified price at a future date and 
if the asset is worth more that the call price the speculator has made a profit. 
F. MARKETS 
Derivatives can also be divided into how they are traded. A derivative contract 
can be traded Over-the-Counter (OTC) or in a specialized market called an exchange. An 
OTC contract is conducted between two parties without the use of a mediator. Swaps, 
forward rate agreements and specialized options are common instruments that are traded 
via the OTC market. The contracts are governed by the International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA).36 Derivatives traded in exchanges are referred to as 
Exchange-traded derivatives. Exchanges are located throughout the world but some of the 
larger exchanges are in: Korea (KOSPI Index Futures and Options), the European Union 
(EUREX Index and interest rate products), and Chicago (the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT)). The exchange acts as a 
marketplace where derivate contracts are traded. The exchange takes a margin from the 
buyer and seller on each side of the trade to cover transaction costs and act as a fee on the 
contract.37 
G. ENERGY DERIVATIVE 
Energy commodities such as oil, gas and power contracts are traded at a few 
different exchanges, specifically the New York’s Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and 
Tokyo’s Commodity Exchange (TOCOM), through a computerized network on the 
Intercontinental Exchange. The purposes of the energy trade are for risk mitigation, 
speculation and for portfolio diversification.38 Trading in the energy derivatives does not, 
however, always mitigate risks. China Aviation Oil (CAO) reported losses in December 
of 2004 that exceeded $550M due to CAO’s inexperience and ungoverned trading in 
energy derivatives.39 The United States has taken measures to counteract the inherent risk 
in the energy trade by establishing regulatory agencies to oversee the trade of energy. The 
                                                 
36 George Kleinman. Trading Commodities and Financial Futures: A step by step Guide to Mastering 
the Market. 3rd. New York: Financial Times Prentice Hall, 2005. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Takahashi, Kosuke. "Jet Fuel Scandal Deals China a Body Blow." Asia Times 07 Dec 2004 : 32.  
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Commodity Futures Trading Commission serves as guard against fraud and manipulation 
of the energy trade market.40 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission also oversees 
the energy derivative market to investigate volume of trades and to see the impact of 
derivative trading on the underlying commodities price.41  
H. SUMMARY 
Derivatives are financial instruments that are hinged upon an underlying asset. 
Futures contracts, forward contracts, swaps and options are all different types of 
derivatives. The derivatives market and more specifically the futures market is utilized by 
businesses, speculators and hedgers to reallocate risk. Derivatives can be traded at an 
exchange or though various markets. Derivatives trading and especially energy trading 
occurs world wide but laws and government agencies do exist that monitor and serve as a 
safeguard in the derivates market. The derivatives market allows for purchasers and 
sellers of contracts to utilize leverage in the marketplace. The use of leverage can yield 
greater gains and losses than outright ownership of a stock, bond or commodity. 
                                                 
40 Krupka, Catherine and Athena Velie. "There's a New Sheriff in Town: Energy Derivatives and 




IV. COMMERCIAL PRACTICES IN JET FUEL HEDGING 
 Chapter Overview: The purpose of this chapter is to examine the strategic 
visions of differing airlines in regards to fuel hedging. We will examine the methods that 
airlines use to hedge fuel costs. We will look at the technological influences on the airline 
industry and how the industry might change in the future. 
A COMPETITIVE LANDSCAPE 
Airline price/earnings ratios are on an average half to a third of the market 
average.42 Since the deregulation of the Airlines in 1978, airline profitability and survival 
has been directly linked to an organization’s ability to control costs.43 In the airline 
industry the most expensive operating cost is labor; fuel costs are the second biggest 
operating expense, representing a 30% operating cost for the airline industry.44 For every 
$1.00 increase in price per gallon, the airlines collectively pay $425M in additional 
operating costs.45 
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) has 261 organizational 
members that represent 94% of the worlds scheduled air traffic providers.46 IATA world 
wide airline losses reached over $3B in 2006 and IATA reported that the airlines as a 
whole have not been profitable since 2000.47 IATA stated that the terrorist attacks of 
2001, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and excess capacity—but mostly 
increased fuel prices—have been cited as causes for unprofitable returns in the airline 
industry.48  
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Air travel and airfreight is a very competitive industry. It is extremely hard for 
airlines to pass increased fuel cost down to the customer because consumers of airline 
tickets and airfreight have different carriers to chose from and have low switching costs. 
Continental Airlines found that they could not raise fares without suffering a major loss 
in passenger traffic and rescinded a fare hike that was in response to higher fuel prices.49 
However, different airlines have different exposure to the volatility of the jet fuel 
market. American Airlines (AA) has a larger capacity than Continental Airlines and alters 
AA ticket prices on a daily basis. Hence AA can adjust its prices to absorb some of the 
risk that goes with floating fuel prices. On the other hand Southwest Airlines promotes 
steady prices and can not afford to expose itself to as much risk in the movement of fuel 
prices. 
The airlines utilize fuel hedging as a risk management tool to bracket operating 
costs. They also utilize the hedging strategy to create a stable predicable cash flow to 
avoid distress in their stock price. Hedging also stabilizes volatility of cash flow and 
helps to make costs more predictable thus aiding the management process. Hedging 
creates value through effective trading; hence, to a point, the more it is done the better off 
the airline is due to learning curve benefit. 
Southwest has been the only major U.S. airline to remain profitable since 
September 11 2001.50 Southwest is also one of the most aggressive fuel hedgers of all the 
airlines. Southwest was able to cap eighty six percent of its fuel needs for 2006 at a price 
of $28 per barrel compared to an industry average of $56 per barrel.51 Southwest’s’ 
aggressive hedging strategy helps the airline when the price of oil continues to climb. If 
there is a sharp decline in the price of oil in the future Southwest will be forced into a 
competitive disadvantage in the airline industry. 
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B. AIRLINES THAT HEDGE VERSUS THOSE THAT DO NOT 
A downturn in the price of oil is the central argument for airlines not to hedge 
against fuel costs. Airlines could be wrong in their estimation of the price of oil. The oil 
market is extremely volatile and can fluctuate sharply. If market prices drop below the 
agreed upon price of a contract it is possible that an airline could pay more than the 
market price for fuel. If an airline is forced to pay for fuel at a high contracted price while 
other airlines are paying significantly lower spot prices the airline that hedged would be 
at a significant financial disadvantage.  
 However, airlines that do not hedge are taking the risk that fuel prices could 
increase and costs will rise. It can be argued that even with hedging fuel prices there is no 
way to truly mitigate risk. Sir Rod Edding was the CEO of British Airways from 2000 to 
2005 and was against the practice of hedging against fuel prices.  
A lot is said about hedging strategy, most of it is well wide of the mark. I 
don’t think any sensible airline believes that by hedging it saves on its fuel 
bills. You just flatten out the bumps and remove the spikes. When you 
hedge all you do is all you do is bet against the experts of the oil market 
and pay the middle man, so you can’t save yourself any money long term. 
You can run from high fuel prices briefly through hedging but you can’t 
run for long.52 
It is worth noting that Sir Rod Edding is no longer the CEO at British Airways and that 
he tried to pass along increased fuel cost to the consumer.53 In air freight, firms such as 
Fed-Ex can pass along fuel costs to the consumer through the use of surcharges but in 
airline travel the reaction of the customer can be unpredictable and consumers may not 
purchase tickets if forced to pay large surcharges. 
 Another explanation for airlines not to utilize hedging strategies is because it 
requires a positive cash flow. Gerard Arpey, the CEO of American Airlines, the world’s 
largest airline, stated that:  
Regrettably, we moved away from our historic hedging program in mid- 
2003 because of our liquidity difficulties," Arpey said in an interview in 
                                                 
52 Cobb, Richard, Alex Wolf "Jet Fuel Hedging Strategies: Options Available to the Airlines and A 
Survey of Industry Practices." Northwestern University 391(2004 ): 17. 
53 "BA's fuel surcharge to increase." BBC News BBC.CO.UK08 Oct 2004 21 Sept 2007 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3726424.stm>. 
  20
Paris on Sunday. "To hedge you need cash or a balance sheet," he said. 
"And in the dark days of 2003, we didn't have either one. Today we're in a 
stronger position and we're hedging again, but you can't turn the clock 
back, so you're now hedging in the $60 range.54 
 
 In recent years hedging has become less effective because as fuel contracts expire 
the new contracts have higher target prices. Airlines that are already in financial trouble 
have a hard time purchasing fuel contracts because the practice of hedging does require 
that firms have cash and or credit with which to purchase future fuel needs along with 
current needs. 
 Hedging is not a core competency of airlines. The business of airlines is 
transporting people and things from point to point. However, if one airline does mitigate 
its exposure to raises in the cost of fuel it could provide that airline with a competitive 
advantage over other airlines. 
 Hedging allows airlines to lessen the volatility and uncertainty of future fuel costs 
which can aid in planning the future financial decisions. Hedging does require funding in 
order to purchase the contracts and pay for transaction costs. Moreover, in order to hedge 
there has to be a party willing to take the risk of becoming counter-party in the deal.  
C. HEDGING METHODS 
 Although it is possible that a contract may result in a higher than market price, the 
airlines use a montage of hedging methods to mitigate their risk. These different financial 
instruments of a hedging strategy include different types of swaps, options, futures 
contracts, forwards contracts and collars strategy. The airlines use a mix of these 
instruments when hedging fuel prices. 
A plain vanilla swap is arranged using the OTC market. The airline normally 
wants the fixed price in exchange for a floating price.55 The two parties settle the contract 
by exchanging money. The money exchanged is the difference between the contracted 
price and the market price of the underlying asset at a set point in time. This contracted 
                                                 
54 "Airline group raises its 2006 loss forecast." International Herald Tribune 05 Jun 2006. 
55 Dave Carter, Dan Rogers, and Betty Simkins. "Fuel Hedging in the Airline Industry: The Case of 
Southwest Airlines." 
  21
swap can run on a monthly, quarterly or even annual basis.56 This is also an off-balance 
sheet financial agreement because the contract involves no exchange of the underlying 
commodity, fuel.57 What the airlines can gain from a plain vanilla swap is a mitigation of 
risk because if the price of fuel goes up they can take the incremental difference gained 
from the contract and use that funding to help pay for the high cost of fuel that the airline 
needs for operations. 
 A differential swap is based on the difference between two different commodities 
and their actual price difference over a set amount of time.58 Airlines can use differential 
swaps to mitigate the exposure to basis risk of a swap. Basis risk is the risk that offsetting 
investments in a hedging strategy will not change price in equal and opposite directions 
from each other.59 This could make for an imperfect correlation between the two 
investments. This can also create the potential for losses in a hedging strategy. A 
differential swap mitigates this risk by enabling the airlines to hedge against the 
imperfection of the swap. 
 Futures contracts let airlines purchase and sell a set amount of a commodity at a 
predetermined point in time. Airlines can utilize futures contracts to smooth the outflow 
of cash for fuel. A forward contract is only settled at maturity while a futures contract is 
re-priced on a daily basis. Airlines utilize forward contracts as a customizable financial 
instrument where airlines will hedge a percentage of fuel usage in each quarter. Airlines 
can use forward contracts to again mitigate their exposure to swings in commodity prices. 
 Southwest Airlines is one carrier that uses this technique. Southwest Airlines 
utilizes call options which is a right to buy a particular asset at a set fixed price at a time 
up until the contract hit its maturity date.60 A call option caps the amount that an airline 
pays for fuel. Airlines commonly purchase heating oil options as a cross market hedge 
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against a rise in the price of jet fuel because the two commodities are highly correlated.61 
Southwest Airlines likes the flexibility that call options provide but the options are 
expensive compared to other financial instruments because of the volatility of the energy 
market.62 In order for a speculator to take the counter-party risk to the airline’s call option 
the put option must have a large payoff. 
 Since the cost of option contracts are high many airlines use a collar which is a 
combination of a put option and a call option. A collar strategy can lock in a price range 
of a commodity for a set amount of time. If an airline buys a call option of $2.00 per 
gallon and sells a put option at $1.00 per gallon the airline will not pay more than $2.00 a 
gallon nor will it pay less than $1.00 a gallon for the life of the contracts. The benefit here 
is that if the price of fuel rises beyond $2.00 the airline will be able to exercise its 
contracts and still pay less than competitors that purchase fuel at the spot price. The 
downside is if the price of jet fuel drops below $1.00 the owners of collars could end up 
paying more than airlines that buy fuel at the spot price. The reason the airlines utilize 
collars is to mitigate risk.  
 Managing the placement of puts and calls for the airline is difficult. The airlines 
do not accomplish this internally but rather outsource such activities. Citigroup Corporate 
and investment banking services states that they have an expertise in the commodity 
market and developing structured hedging solutions.63 Airlines which constitute some of 
Citibank’s customers are able to take advantage of the services which enables them to tap 
into a worldwide network which enables the airlines a market to mitigate their fuel cost 
risks. 
 Southwest Airlines uses a variety of derivative instruments. Southwest Airlines 
utilizes both crude oil and heating oil based derivatives to mitigate its exposure to jet fuel 
                                                 
61 Dave Carter, Dan Rogers, and Betty Simkins. "Fuel Hedging in the Airline Industry: The Case of 
Southwest Airlines." 
62 Dave Carter,., Dan Rogers, and Betty Simkins. "Fuel Hedging in the Airline Industry: The Case of 
Southwest Airlines." 
63 James Barker. "Hedging the FX of Jet Fuel Exposure." Citigroup Corporate and Investment 
Banking. Client Presentation, New York. 31 Oct 2006 . 
  23
prices.64 Other instruments are call options, collar structures and fixed price swaps.65 As 
old contracts expire new contract are obtained so that Southwest can utilize a rolling 
hedging strategy. Hedging gains are recorded as reduction on the balance sheet credited 
to fuel and oil expense.66 This is important because gains from hedging are reported as 
reductions in operations costs not as a straight forward gain from speculation therefore 
the amount of tax applied to the gain is less than if such speculation were not connected 
to an operating cost.  
D. FUTURE STRATEGY OF THE AIRLINE MARKETPLACE 
 In order to stay competitive in the airline industry airlines will have to hedge 
against rising costs of fuel. Fuel costs in recent history have been going up and this cuts 
into the profit margin of airlines because of the increases in operations costs. Airlines that 
do utilize a hedging strategy have a short term competitive advantage over those airlines 
that do not have a hedging strategy. Southwest Airlines, which has an aggressive hedging 
strategy, has produced a profit while other major carriers that do not hedge have lost 
money. Hedging fuel prices has helped Southwest Airlines gain a competitive advantage 
by reducing costs. Yet if the price of fuel rapidly declines the competitive advantage that 
Southwest and other low cost carriers had due to hedging would turn into a competitive 
disadvantage because the fuel hedged airlines would be forced to pay higher than spot oil 
prices. Moreover, low cost carriers like Southwest Airlines and Jet Blue will have to 
continue to hedge against fuel costs as these cost rise because they are competing on the 
basis of price. If these low cost carriers can pay less then their competitors for fuel they 
can increase their profit. The larger legacy carriers will have to continue to become more 
aggressive in their hedging strategy if they too want to remain competitive if the cost of 
jet fuel continues to rise. 
Conversely if the cost of fuel falls rapidly low cost carriers like Southwest 
Airlines may be subjected to paying higher than spot prices for fuel due to their contracts. 
If this were to happen heavily hedged airlines could be operating at a loss. In this case the 
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short term competitive advantage would be gained by the airlines that did not hedge their 
fuel costs and depending on the severity of the drop in oil prices hedged airlines could be 
at a competitive disadvantage for several years. However, hedging is not the only change 
that must be made in the airline industry. 
 It is important to note that hedging is not a long term solution to ward off rising 
fuel costs. Airlines in the future will be constantly trying to improve jet fuel efficiency.67 
Airplanes need fuel in order to run however; airlines can conserve fuel by reducing 
onboard weight. This can be accomplished by more accurately predicting weather 
patterns so that fuel consumption and fuel load can be lowered. An example of this is 
planning routs to maximize or minimize the effects of the jet-stream’s flow which can 
either increase or decrease fuel efficiency depending on direction. Airlines have 
redesigned the hub and spoke method of airline travel so that longer, higher cruise times 
can be established, which utilize less gas than the takeoff and landing phases of flight.68 
Airlines may also participate in pooling methods so that the customers are shuttled 
between carriers to insure full loads on every trip. Airlines may employ a bulk buying 
strategy where the airlines join forces and procure fuel as a conglomerate to lower 
costs.69 In the future airlines will also be using retrofit material to increase the fuel 
efficiency of their aircraft. For example, winglets, which can be added to an aircrafts 
wingtip, can significantly reduce drag and help to conserve fuel.70 
The advent of new technology will be extremely important to the strategic future 
of airlines because more fuel efficient aircraft are being fabricated by the Boeing and 
Airbus aircraft manufacturing firms. The Boeing 787 which is scheduled to enter service 
in May of 2008 is partially made of composite materials that will significantly reduce its 
fuel consumption.71  
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Airbus has decided to go a different way then Boeing as is developing a 500 seat 
super jumbo jet called the A380. The A380 can carry so many people that Airbus claims 
that the burn rate per seat will be reduced.72 
E. SUMMARY 
 The airline industry has a very competitive landscape and the events of September 
11th hurt the airline industry as a whole financially. Fuel cost comprises a large portion of 
airlines operating costs. Fuel hedging has become a method in which airlines try to make 
their operating costs more predictable.  
                                                 
72 "Airbus A380 Super Jumbo Twin-Deck, Twin-Aisle Airliner, Europe." Aerospace-Technology.Com  



















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALY LEFT BLANK 
  27
V. EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE DOD IN THE FUTURES 
MARKET 
 Chapter Overview: The purpose of this chapter is to explain what steps the DoD 
and the United States Government have taken in regard taken to hedge fuel prices. This 
chapter explains who the stakeholders would be if the DoD were to employ a hedging 
strategy and how well the DoD would fit within the hedging marketplace. The chapter 
will then outline the benefits and the drawbacks to the DoD entering the hedging 
marketplace and discuss the alternatives that the DoD is assessing to decrease their jet 
fuel usage.  
A. DOD AND HEDGING HISTORY 
 The Under Secretary of Defense (USD) tasked the Defense Business Board to 
examine ways in which the DoD exposure to fuel price volatility could be reduced.73 This 
occurred in 2003 after the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed the DoD to 
consider fuel hedging.74 The task group reported its findings to the USD in March of 
2004. 
 The task group was made up of defense industry representatives, private sector oil 
industry representatives and representatives from various United States airlines.75 The 
process the task group employed was to look at how the DoD procures fuel and compare 
and contrast how airlines procure fuel. The task group found that hedging was a vital part 
of how airlines operate. The task group summary recommendations were:  
The Board’s Task Group concluded that DoD could feasibly hedge its fuel 
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 program that does not disrupt commercial markets. Though DoD is a 
large consumer of fuels, its consumption does not exceed that of a major 
airline by a significant amount.76 
 
 The task group concluded that there were two options: not to hedge or to institute 
a low-risk pilot program.77 The OMB recommended the DoD engage in the pilot program 
but senior OMB analysts stated that the choice to implement the program is a DoD 
decision.78 Hence the OMB was not going to take the responsibility of instituting a 
program and it was going to become another task that the DoD would have to undertake. 
The DoD retorted that the OMB should consider seeking legislative authority to engage 
in hedging by entering into an agreement with the Department of Interior’s Mineral 
Management Services Group (MMS) to reduce the fuel price volatility.79  
The MMS is a Federal Bureau, in the Department of the Interior, responsible for 
collecting, auditing and disbursing revenues from mineral leases on Federal and 
American Indian lands and natural resources on the federally-controlled outer continental 
shelf which extends from three miles off the coast of most states to about 200 miles at 
sea.80 The MMS collect royalties from leases, rents and exploration bonuses from oil gas 
and other companies that utilize Federal sites.81 The MMS distributes revenue to 
American Indians whose land is leases through the MMS, and to individual states whose 
land or water is leased through the MMS. In FY07 the MMS distributed $1.9B in royalty  
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receipts to thirty four states.82 However, over 50% of the collected revenues or over 
$5.5B is distributed to various Federal special-use accounts to include the General Fund 
of U.S. Treasury.83 
The DoD was seeking an internal hedge because the MMS generates revenue each 
year by leasing off-shore energy resources and in recent history as fuel prices have risen 
sharply, the revenues of the MMS have grown. Conversely as fuel prices have risen the 
DoD’s operation budget, partially due to increases in fuel prices, has risen. Essentially 
what the DoD recommended was a transfer of money from the MMS to the DoD due to 
changes in jet fuel prices.84 The DoD felt that such a transfer could help to alleviate the 
problem of rising fuel costs without the DoD’s entry into the commercial hedging 
marketplace.85 At the conclusion of the task force no steps were taken for the DoD to 
enter the commercial hedging marketplace nor was an internal transfer of funds between 
the DoD and the MMS established. However, one point the task group failed to note was 
what price fuel must reach so that it would be feasible for the DoD to enter the 
commercial hedging market.  
B. METHOD OF IMPLEMENTATION  
The one solid output from the task group was that if the DoD were to enter into a 
commercial hedging operation it would have to be the DoD that petitions Congress to do 
so. The OMB stated such during the debriefing of the task forces’ findings.86 
So the next step would be for the DoD to petition Congress to allow the DoD to 
set up a trading unit in the commercial hedging market or to outsource the activity. An 
organic method or setting up an autonomous unit that would run the hedging activity for 
the DoD would be costly and is outside the DoD’s expertise. 
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 However, an organic operation could help to provide the operational security that 
the DoD may need to successfully implement a hedging strategy.  
Outsourcing or hiring trading specialist in the financial world to institute the 
options trading is a more feasible solution to the organic method because the hedging 
expertise is in the commercial environment not in the DoD. The outsourcing could be 
accomplished with a firm that operates within the market of futures and options trading. 
A contract would exist between the selected firm and the DoD to create a price incentive 
and return on investment so that a cost benefit could be realized for the contracted firm, 
the DoD, the federal government and the taxpayer. 
C. STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS 
If the DoD were to enter the commercial fuel market many different agencies, 
people and nations would be affected; laws would have to be changed to allow the DoD 
to operate in the open market place and create a profit. Hence, OMB would have to 
petition Congress to pass regulation to allow the DoD to enter a commercial hedging 
market, and Congress would have to appropriate funds in order to establish hedging 
capability. OMB may not be inclined to support such a petition especially because in 
2004 the OMB stated that the decision to enter the market would be the DoD’s possibly 
because OMB does not want to accept the risk associated with recommending a hedging 
strategy. Congress may not be inclined to authorize the DoD to enter the marketplace 
because its representatives may not be to keen on how their constituents view the DoD in 
the commercial marketplace. Also DoD’s procurement is limited to products and 
services. Laws would have to be passed that allow for the DoD to procure financial 
instruments. Additionally the DoD lacks the authority to retire gains from the purchase of 
a financial position so additional laws would have to be passed that allow for the DoD to 
garner the benefits after a position has been sold.  
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is an 
international Organization made up of eleven oil producing nations. OPEC may change 
pricing policy in an unfavorable way if the DoD enters the hedging market for oil 
procurement. There is no evidence to support this theory but it is viable in light of recent 
world events where the United States is not always considered a favored nation. 
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The DoD purchases more fuel than any single airline hence the Airline Industry: 
would have to compete with the DoD in the hedging market place. However this may 
have a positive influence on the airlines. Delta Airlines, American Airlines and United 
Airlines combined purchase more than twice as much jet fuel as the DoD.87 So if the 
DoD entered the hedging market it would be just another customer that would increase 
the liquidity of the marketplace which could make the market more efficient.88 
Additionally the DoD is not concerned with profit like the airlines. The goal of the DoD 
in the hedging market would be to stabilize prices of fuel to decrease the cost of 
operations in a budget cycle if the cost of fuel continues to rise. Decreasing budget flux 
would be an end goal of the DoD and they would have shorter time horizon contracts 
than the commercial airlines so even though the DoD is the biggest single buyer of fuel it 
most probably would not be the biggest single hedger of fuel prices because they have a 
shorter time horizon.  
The financial industry would be another stakeholder if the DoD decided to enter 
into the hedging market because they would have to take the DoD on as a customer. The 
DoD has consistently done business at a slower pace than the private commercial market 
and the meshing of the two communities may prove to be a problem. Additionally, a 
potential DoD problem may be who to choose to carry out the DoD’s hedging strategy. 
This would be a substantial contract for any financial institution and the DoD must be 
very careful in its source selection 
Individual oil production companies such as Shell, British Petroleum (BP), and 
Exxon Mobil will have a vested interest in the DoD’s entry into the commercial hedging 
market because it could affect their stock prices. If the public sees a large consumer like 
the DoD getting a break on oil prices it could be construed as a weakness of the oil 
producing industry to maintain its customer base. This could prompt investors to sell their 
interest in major oil companies. Even though the DoD’s entry in the commercial hedging 
market is not a sign of weakness of the oil industry the public response to news in erratic 
ways and this may have a negative affect on large oil companies stock prices.  
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Other nations that are friendly or hostile towards the United States may have a 
fundamental problem with the DoD entering the commercial hedging market because of 
the appearance of possible political influence for economic gain. An entry into the 
commercial hedging market could be seen by some nations as an attempt to influence the 
market through the use of military power and congressionally appropriated funding.  
In the past the American public has blamed individual firms when oil prices have 
spiked.89 American voters may not like the idea of their tax dollars being utilized to 
hedge commodity prices. Voters could hold their representatives responsible for future oil 
price hikes especially if the American press spins a story that places the blame of increase 
fuel prices on the DoD’s entry into the hedging market. Also if prices of fuel rapidly drop 
and the DoD ends up paying more than the spot price for fuel the American public could 
become enraged that their tax dollars were spent in a failed hedging pursuit. 
The DoD Services would also be a stakeholder if the DoD were to implement a 
hedging strategy. The Air Force, utilizing over 50% of the fuel budget, would have to 
show large cost savings associated with fuel hedging. Even though the fuel budget is a 
small percentage of the overall DoD budget results will have to be shown and this may 
mean that the Air Force would have to give up some of its current funding in order to 
fund a pilot program for hedging. However, such an investment would be extremely 
viable for the Air Force as the largest DoD consumer of fuel. The OMB forecasted costs 
for fuel have been historically of the mark.90 Having a stabilized cost for fuel will help 
the Air Force plan and execute its budget with more accuracy. This will hopefully 
eliminate the need for the large supplemental budget requests. The Navy and Army will 
also have to realize a cost savings and identify any logistical problems hedging might 
have. Since they are not as large a consumer of fuel as the Air Force, the Navy and Army 
and other DoD agencies may have less of a motivation to enter into a hedging strategy. 
Increased fuel costs is a universal DoD problem but if all the individual DoD agencies do 
not support a hedging program there may not be enough support to institute the program.  
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D. MARKETPLACE ISSUES 
The DoD participating in a commercially acceptable practice such as hedging 
would not be totally unique. Mexico, Brazil and Chile utilize the oil derivative market.91 
The Thrift Savings Plan which functions as a DoD 401(k) is commercially managed by 
Barclays Global Investors. Government municipalities, transportation authorities and 
government sponsored power cooperatives utilize hedging strategies.92 Fannie Mae, 
Ginnie Mae, and Freddie Mac are government sponsored entities which utilize hedges to 
manage risk.93 The DoD is different from other government agencies but it does share 
these agencies’ fiduciary duty to be responsible to the money that has been appropriated. 
Hedging fuel costs may be a method to better protect the tax payer dollar. 
However it must be noted that the core mission of the DoD is not and will never 
be to hedge fuel prices; however the core mission of the airlines is not to hedge fuel 
prices either. Yet both the DoD and the airlines could utilize hedging as a tool to control 
cost. In order to establish a successful hedging strategy, the DoD would have to utilize 
the expertise of the private sector. Industry experts in the financial world, airline industry 
and oil industry must be leveraged. 
E. BENEFITS OF ENTRY 
 The benefits of the DoD entering the commercial hedging marketplace are that the 
overall cost that the DoD pays for fuel could be stabilized. Another benefit is that the 
operational commands would not have to curtail operations due to constrained resources 
of fuel due to the high prices. Hedging fuel rising fuel prices could also help to create a 
stable, predictable budget outlay. This would help the DoD project their budget with 
more accuracy and improve the management of federal funds. If the DoD were better 
able to predict their cash flow and operating costs, supplemental appropriations possibly 
could be lessened and this would enable the DoD to invest in under-funded programs. 
 Beyond predictability hedging helps to stabilize the process of cash flow. DoD 
programs must operate in a unique environment governed by DoD directives, Federal 
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laws, regulations and policies along with Defense Acquisition policies that influence 
funding profiles for programs. The derived funding profiles along with technological 
hurdles and management of people and resources dictate program schedules. When 
funding is pulled from a program in order to pay for current year fuel costs the 
aforementioned program endures a cost of delay.94 The cost of delay of funding 
contributes to schedule slips, wasted effort, loss of manpower, scheduled equipment and 
missed opportunities to advance the program. 
The programs in the DoD must base their schedule on moving budget targets 
because of unpredictable cash flow. The increase in fuel prices has contributed to the 
cash flow problems of the DoD. If the DoD programs have strong predictable cash flow 
tied to a realistic schedule the program will have a greater likelihood of success.95 
However, once the resources are removed from a program it is extremely hard to 
maintain the original schedule. The DoD can not continue to cut funding of future 
programs in order to pay for current year fuel bills. 
F. DRAWBACKS OF ENTRY 
 The major drawback to implementing a strategic fuel hedging strategy is that it 
might not work. If the price of fuel does go down dramatically the DoD could end up 
paying more than they would have if they procured fuel at the spot price because the DoD 
would have contracted to do so. Also if a hedging strategy is not implemented correctly 
the result could be that the DoD pays more for fuel than they should. Hedging involves 
the mitigation of risk and the use of leverage. If the financial institution that does the 
DoD bidding does not do so correctly then tax payer dollars could be lost. 
 The DoD does not have the internal knowledge to create a financial arm that 
could compete with the stabled commercial market. The DoD does not have the 
experience in this area nor is hedging in the DoD’s core competency. So one could make 
the argument that since hedging is not a core competency then it should not be done. 
Moreover, the DoD is a captive market the operations tempo can change quickly and the 
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need for fuel can be reduced. If the operations tempo dropped radically there would be 
less money to be saved via hedging and the upfront costs of setting up a hedging strategy 
would be hard to recover. 
 The DoD also has to be clandestine in its pursuit for commodities. The DoD must 
practice good operational security. Jet fuel futures may be a tip to the enemy about the 
United States Military future operational tempo. 
 Another major drawback is that in order to have a successful hedging strategy 
capital is needed in order to procure the contracts. The DoD is in a cash-strapped position 
and hedging would require additional funding that would take away support for other 
programs. 
 Another drawback is the political obstacles of implementing a hedging strategy. 
Laws must be passed in order for the DoD to market itself in the commercial futures 
market. Passing these laws will take a lot of time and energy from the members that 
might be better used on some other initiatives. Also it appears that no one agency is 
willing to take the political risk needed to institute a hedging program for the DoD. For 
representatives it is not a great political move to champion a hedging program for the 
DoD because it has a lot of risks associated with it whether it fails or succeeds. 
 Public sentiment is another drawback to the DoD entering the hedging market. 
GWOT and other U.S. military operations have garnered the attention of the world. If the 
DoD were to enter the commercial hedging market there could be a negative public 
response that would cost the DoD more then it could ever save through the use of 
hedging. 
G. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
 Hedging fuel prices is not the only solution that the DoD should be looking at to 
solve its high fuel price problem. The U.S. as a nation is a large consumer of fossil fuels 
and alternate means of energy must be developed to help alleviate the DoD’s dependence 
on fossil fuels. Additionally we have seen alternate oil extraction methods such as the 
natural gas transformation and oil sands procurement evolve recently as the price for oil 
has made these energy option more viable. Hedging provides a financial solution to the 
budgeting problem but it does not address the overall core need of the DoD as an energy 
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consumer. If the DoD starts to utilize other methods of energy the need to enter the 
futures market might decrease because the political drawback could outweigh the cost 
savings potential. 
For example, the Department of Energy has teamed with the DoD in the 
establishment of research into green fuels. If aggressive steps are made and the DoD’s 
dependence on fossil fuels is drastically reduced there may be no need for the DoD to 
trade on the futures market.  
Coal-to-Liquid Fuels is another way in which the DoD could reduce its reliance 
on fossil fuel. The United States has a very large reserve of coal. According to the 
National Mining Association the U.S. has over 500 billion tons of coal which is enough 
to satisfy a growing coal demand for over 200 years.96 However coal extraction and 
transformation to liquid form is costly. Moreover, establishing the infrastructure to 
perform the coal-to-jet-fuel transformation is costly.97 The Air Force is already involved 
in a series of tests of synthetic fuels. A B-52 from the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot Air Force 
Base, N.D. performed test flights with its reconfigured engines running on mixtures of 
synthetic fuel.98 The flight that utilized a mixture of synthetic fuels and jet fuel was 
deemed successful and further cold weather testing has been scheduled.99 
Providing the capital to initiatives like coal-to-liquid fuels may prove to be a 
better investment in the long term than utilizing the futures market because of the 
technological advancements in energy extractions. 
Fuel Cells could also reduce the DoD’s reliance on fossil fuels. The DoD is also 
involved in the procurement and development of fuel cells. Fuel cells are advantageous 
due their short logistical constraints. Fuel use is characterized by large multipliers and 
factors because it takes fuel to deliver fuel.100 
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Currently the DoD is using a lot of fuel to deliver fuel, via tanker refueling, 
Aircraft carriers and fuel mobility vehicles. Fuel cells and their demand on the open 
market may make hedging the oil futures market a futile task. 
H. SUMMARY 
 In this chapter we have discussed the steps that the DoD and the United States 
government has made in regard to fuel hedging and what conclusions that senior leaders 
have drawn from investigation commercial practices. We have addressed the stakeholders 
if the DoD were to institutes a hedging strategy. We also conveyed the benefits and the 
drawbacks to the DoD entering the commercial hedging marketplace. The chapter closed 
with a discussion of the current alternatives to hedging that the DoD is looking to the 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Although hedging has proved successful in the short run for the commercial 
airlines the DoD should not enter the commercial hedging market to help mitigate the 
DoD’s exposure to higher fuel prices. If laws were passed and political support was given 
to a pilot hedging strategy the DoD might be successful in limiting its exposure to swings 
in the price of fuel. The DoD could enter the market and not cause a disruption due to its 
volume but might be disruptive because the DoD is a government entity. Also as a 
government and military entity engaging in a commercial market hedging strategy may 
compromise operational security.  
The DoD also does not have the resources to implement a hedging strategy. Such 
an endeavor would have to be outsourced and capital would be needed in order to fund 
the project. The DoD is running at a deficit currently and has repeatedly needed 
supplemental funding to continue operations. Hence funding could be better placed on 
other requirements instead of outsourcing a pilot program for fuel hedging. 
The public may perceive the DoD use of derivate investing as a risky endeavor 
and this could tarnish the reputation of the DoD. The support of the public is extremely 
helpful to the DoD. Losing public support in order to hedge fuel costs is not a comparable 
tradeoff. 
There is also inherent risk when dealing with hedging strategy. The DoD could 
lose money in the short term if the futures market changes rapidly. In the long term if the 
DoD established itself with a formidable hedging strategy they would most probably 
realize a cost savings. However, the potential cost savings at this point in time do not 
outweigh the political drawbacks of the DoD’s entrance into the futures market. 
Politically it does not make sense for a representative to support a DoD hedging 
strategy. The reason is that the stakeholder base would have too much to lose and would 
not be inclined to support such an endeavor. Politically elected officials need to be 
prudent with their involvement with tax payer dollars. Derivative trading is currently 
viewed as a risky behavior. Once the public perception of derivative trading changes so 
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that people do not view it as a risky endeavor but rather a risk mitigation tool the political 
risks of supporting a hedging strategy may be lessened. 
Technological solutions and breakthroughs such as synthetic fuels could also 
lower fuel costs that make commercial hedging un-profitable. It is much less risky for a 
politician to support alternative fuel research than a financial hedging endeavor.  
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VII. SUGGESTIONS 
 The DoD should not hedge in the commercial market but the OMB should seek 
legislative authority to engage in non-market hedging by making an intergovernmental 
arrangement with the DoD and the Department of the Interior’s MMS group. One large 
benefit of this arrangement is that the DoD does not have to take a politically charged risk 
by entering the commercial market. Thus the threat of opposing public opinion is 
thwarted because it is an internal hedge. The DoD also does not expose itself to 
commercial risk within the derivates market. The oil market is cyclical and the DoD 
could end up on the wrong side of a trade and pay more than the spot price for oil but 
with an internal hedge this risk is mitigated. Another benefit is that the floatation costs 
and the costs of outsourcing a commercial hedging outlet could be avoided. A downside 
to this internal hedge is that certain government agencies that have earmarked themselves 
as beneficiaries of the revenue generated by the MMS may have to share future revenues 
with the DoD. Royalties from oil and gas exploration are the government’s second largest 
source of revenue, behind income tax.101 The MMS is a large revenue generator and 
individual state representatives may not want the DoD to utilize funds generated by the 
MMS. 
 The MMS generated over $11B in FY07 in revenue through its energy 
resources.102 In FY07 the MMS collected a record setting $4.4B in oil royalty revenue 
from the sale of over 584M barrels of oil. This volume is significantly higher that the 
144M barrels of oil utilized by the DoD on an annual basis.103The MMS royalties are 
calculated by taking the production volume and multiplying it by the royalty rate which is 
12% for land based extraction and 16% for offshore production.104Hence, there is a 
correlation between the MMS’s revenue generation and the DoD’s funding requirements 
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to changes in fuel prices. If the price of oil continues to rise the MMS has the capability 
to fund the DoD’s shortfall due to increased oil prices.  
Conversely if the price of fuel drops the MMS collects less revenue off of its 
leases but the DoD would be paying less on the open market for fuel. In such a case the 
DoD would transfer funds back to the MMS to cover less than expected revenue 
generation. In the past when oil prices were low the MMS implemented a royalty relief 
program under the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995 which gave oil companies 
relief from paying funds due on their lease of drilling rights granted by the MMS.105 
Relief of royalties cut the profits for the MMS and if oil prices drop in the future the 
MMS may need an infusion of funds from the DoD. 
The OMB could manage the internal hedge and the exchange of capital between 
the two agencies and the public market will not need to be involved. Hence there would 
be a reduction in the amount that the DoD seeks in supplemental funding and the 
negative impacts to the OMB’s forecasts, DoD funding profiles and program schedules 
could be minimized in the short run. In the long term the MMS could receive funding 
from a transfer of funds from the DoD when oil prices go down. 
 However, the internal hedge is also just a short term solution. The price of oil will 
continue to fluctuate up and down in the future. The internal hedge would only help the 
DoD alleviate its cash flow problems generated by the recent increase in fuel prices. 
 The long term solution is the DoD should pursue its alternative energy projects. 
Using capital on research and development could yield a technological solution that is far 
superior to the financial solution of hedging fuel prices. The Air Force’s use of synthetic 
fuels may prove to be incredibly profitable especially if it could be adapted to the civilian 
market place to include the airlines. Such an endeavor would be beneficial to both the 
DoD and the civilian market because with a higher volume more strategically placed 
supply lines could be established to provide synthetic fuel to more customers at a lower 
cost. 
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The non-market hedging relationship between the MMS and the DoD could aid in 
the development of alternative fuel solutions. The most promising alternative fuel 
solution is the coal to liquid synthetic fuel because the United States has large domestic 
coal recourses and the synthetic fuel has been tested on legacy systems such as the Air 
Force’s B 52 bomber. The MMS controls the leases to federally owned coal, oil and 
natural gas resources. In order to increase the viability of the coal to liquid transformation 
on the commercial market the MMS could provide financial incentives for coal mining 
and coal-to-liquid transformation simply by decreasing its royalty rate for coal 
exploration. This would increase the commercial viability of the process and provide the 
military with a cheaper alternative fuel that has been proven to work on some legacy 
weapon systems. 
The DoD will always have a large energy need. In the future as legacy inefficient 
systems are retired and new fuel efficient and alternative energy systems are introduced 
the DoD’s dependency on oil will decrease. Hedging either internally or on the 
commercial market is only a short term solution. An internal hedge between the DoD and 
the MMS would provide a short term solution to the DoD’s problem and establish a long 
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